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Across  the  tropics,  development  banks  and  conservation  donors  are  investing  millions  in  property
mapping  and  registration  projects  to improve  accountability  for deforestation.  An evaluation  of the  effec-
tiveness  and  accuracy  of  existing  environmental  registries  is  crucial  to assure  the  success  of  future  efforts.
This study  presents  an  evaluation  of deforestation  and  registration  behavior  in response  to one  of  the
largest  of  these  property  registration  programs  to date — the  Rural  Environmental  Registry  (CAR)  in the
Amazonian  state  of  Pará.  From  late  2007  to  2013,  approximately  100,000  properties  covering  30  million
hectares  of  self-declared  claims  were  entered  in  this  digital  registry.  We  used  ﬁxed  effects  regression
models  and  property  level  data  to assess  how  registration  inﬂuenced  deforestation  on  different  sizes
of properties.  Registration  had  little  impact  on deforestation  behavior,  with  the  exception  of a signiﬁ-
cant  reduction  on  “smallholder”  properties  in  the  size  range  of  100–300  ha. We  link this  reduction  to
interacting  incentives  from  forest  protection  and  land  regularization  policies  and  suggest  that  desire  to
strengthen  land  claims  motivates  these  landholders’  response  to  the  environmental  registry.  We  also
present  evidence  that  some  landholders  may  be registering  incomplete  or inaccurate  parcels  into  the
self-declared  system  to strategically  beneﬁt  from  policy  incentives.  Our  results  for  smallholder  proper-
ties indicate  that  environmental  registries  may  have  potential  to  facilitate  reductions  in deforestation
if  combined  with  a favorable  combination  of incentives.  However,  in places  where  land  tenure  is  still
being  negotiated,  the  utility  of  environmental  registries  for forest  policy  enforcement  and  research  may
be  limited  without  ongoing  investment  to  resolve  uncertainty  around  land  claims.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY license. Introduction
.1. The importance and challenge of clarifying land ownership
Many of the world’s most biodiverse and carbon-rich forests
re located in places where land tenure is uncertain. It is difﬁcult to
esign programs that reduce deforestation without knowing who
s making land use decisions, and landscape level conservation ini-
iatives require information about private lands beyond protected
reas. Reliable property maps are now a requirement for many
EDD projects because property boundary data help signal whom
o reward for ecosystem services (Larson et al., 2013; Naughton-
reves and Wendland, 2014; Duchelle et al., 2014). Property maps
lso aid environmental monitoring by indicating whom to penal-
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264-8377/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ize for land use violations. Beyond facilitating the allocation of
carrots and sticks, property maps can improve understanding of
the drivers of land use change by illuminating different patterns
among different types of actors (Geoghegan et al., 1998; Liverman
and Cuesta, 2008). For these reasons and others, conservation and
development organizations, from The Nature Conservancy to the
Inter-American Development Bank, are investing millions in large
scale land registration programs in Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Peru,
Guatemala, Rwanda, Ecuador and many other tropical countries.
Despite the potential beneﬁts, clarifying land ownership is not
without risks. For forests, these include hastened deforestation to
establish claims (e.g. De Oliveira, 2008), conﬂict induced deforesta-
tion accompanying land reform (e.g. Alston et al., 2000), and heavier
investments in forest-displacing agriculture under greater tenure
security (e.g. Liscow, 2013). Risks for people include loss of informal
collective access, exacerbated conﬂict, and capture of land by elites
(Araujo et al., 2009; Rajão, 2013; Paulino, 2014). Many of these
risks are associated with the act of establishing or changing rights to
land (e.g. land reform and land titling programs). Because programs
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Despite policy-makers’ intentions to keep the processes of map-
ping and claiming separate, landholders may  reasonably perceive
the processes to be overlapping.94 J. L’Roe et al. / Land Us
hat allocate land rights can be expensive and politically fraught
Deininger and Feder, 2009), and because outcomes for forests can
e mixed (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Robinson et al., 2014),
roups concerned with forest management are experimenting with
and registration programs that simply map  existing claims. Rather
han alter the security of land rights, the goal of this type of environ-
ental land registry is to reveal and systematize information about
and users for the purposes of monitoring and planning (Bennett
t al., 2013).
Programs to reform land rights have received much scholarly
ttention, but few studies have evaluated the outcomes of programs
o map land claims in environmental registries, partly because these
ystems are relatively new and evolving (Gignoux et al., 2013;
ut see Rajão et al., 2012; Azevedo et al., 2014). Environmental
egistries are intended to reduce deforestation by facilitating mon-
toring and enforcement of environmental policies. However, if
ost land is not registered, if there are conﬂicting incentives, or
hen property data are not accessible or reliable, then registries
ill not necessarily reduce deforestation. There is also a risk that
and users may  attempt to subvert the system by undertaking clear-
ng prior to registering, by registering only parts of their land, or by
nterpreting their registration as a permit to clear (Chomitz, 2007;
ajão et al., 2012; Azevedo and Saito, 2013). This paper provides
mpirical evidence to aid the design of ongoing land registration
nitiatives and to elucidate discussions about the role of different
ctors and incentives that affect Amazon deforestation. We  address
he following questions about environmental registries: ﬁrst, under
hat circumstances does registration cause people to reduce defor-
station, or perversely, to increase it? next, what are the tradeoffs
etween information quantity and information quality when land
egistrations are declaratory?, and ﬁnally, what are the implications
f mapping properties without resolving land rights if landowner-
hip is still being negotiated, as is often the case at development
rontiers? To engage these questions, this study evaluates one of
he largest environmental registration programs in the tropics.
.2. Background: land registration in Pará’s Rural Environmental
egistry
Environmental registration initiatives in Brazil are globally
mportant because they cover millions of hectares of forested land
nd are serving as examples for programs in other countries. Brazil’s
orest Code requires land users to maintain forest on a certain
roportion of their property—up to 80% for most of the Ama-
on biome (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). To facilitate monitoring and
nforcement of this policy, the Brazilian government is developing
 System of Rural Environmental Registries (Portuguese acronym:
ICAR) with the aim of mapping and digitizing all rural proper-
ies in the country. The new national system draws from several
ntecedent state systems, each with somewhat different proce-
ures and objectives, beginning with the System for Environmental
icensing (Portuguese acronym: SLAPR) in the State of Mato Grosso
n the early 1990s (Azevedo and Saito, 2013). Expectations for these
rograms have been high among the international environmen-
al community and within Brazil (Fearnside, 2003; Chomitz, 2007).
or example, a recent study quoted a senior Brazilian government
fﬁcial: “[with GIS], deforestation in these areas is going to have a
ame and a surname. This fact certainly leads to a sensible increase
n the governance capability of the environmental agencies in the
mazon states” (Rajão et al., 2012). We  evaluate deforestation and
egistration behavior in response to the largest of the state pro-
rams, Pará’s Rural Environmental Registry (Portuguese acronym:
AR), which began in 2008 and by 2013 comprised over 100,000
roperty boundary registrations covering over 30 million hectares
f Amazon Forest (Fig. 1).y 57 (2016) 193–203
There are several characteristics of the environmental registry
in Pará that affect its impacts and how it might apply to other
regions. Land distribution in Pará is highly skewed; small prop-
erties (here a “small” property can exceed 100 ha) abut ranches of
several thousand hectares or more due to waves of agrarian reform
settlements and colonization projects targeting different actors
(Pacheco, 2009). Pará is famous for land conﬂicts and properties
continue to be claimed, expropriated, and fought over—sometimes
violently (Schmink, 1982; Fearnside, 2001; Wright and Wolford,
2003; Simmons, 2005). Forged titles are common, ofﬁcial titles are
rare, and the ability to make and defend claims to land is at the
forefront of people’s minds, especially in frontier regions (Oliveira,
2013; Campbell, 2014; Reydon et al., 2015). Faced with the chal-
lenge of informal and contested land rights in much of the state
(one study estimated as much as 53% as of 2008) (Barreto et al.,
2008), the designers of Pará’s CAR program adopted a two-phased
system. In the ﬁrst phase, the goal was  coverage: as many claims
as possible would be mapped by land users, who essentially drew
the boundaries of properties on high resolution imagery, aided by
GIS technicians deployed across the state (SIMLAM, 2008; Benatti
and Fischer, 2011). This provisional stage epitomizes the goal of
trying to simply map  claims without altering or adjudicating land
rights. A “deﬁnitive” CAR license could later be obtained after a
second phase in which property boundaries and ownership were
externally veriﬁed and owners submitted a plan for complying with
environmental laws (SIMLAM, 2008). Five years after the start of
the program, as of November 2013, only 2% of the CAR registra-
tions in Pará had advanced to “deﬁnitive” licenses. The other 98%
of registrations were “provisional” CAR licenses, automatically gen-
erated in response to self-declared boundaries entered in an online
system.
1.3. Theory: incentives, perceptions, and property size
A policy’s impacts come partly from its design and objectives,
but also from the way  people respond according to their own aims
and agendas. We  examine property size patterns in Pará’s envi-
ronmental registry to provide clues about landholder motivations
when they registered their holdings.
Why  would landholders choose to make their properties more
visible to environmental monitoring? Both the government and
private sector have offered an array of incentives to encourage reg-
istration, including access to certain kinds of credit and markets1
(Azevedo et al., 2014; Gibbs et al., 2015). Another strong incentive
for mapping a property into a government system in this region is
to bolster the strength and legitimacy of land claims, even though a
provisional CAR license expressly did not signify any change in the
legal status of land claims in Pará (Pará State Decree N◦ 1,148/2008).
Nonetheless, ﬁeld-based studies have described a common sen-
timent that land policy in this region is in an uncertain stage of
rapid formation and as such, claimants have been hustling to gain
a favorable position under policies deemed likely in the future;
mapped boundaries in a government registry may  gain legal status
later (Campbell, 2014). Moreover, for properties below a certain
size, enrolling in the environmental registry was a required step
in a concurrent but less widespread program for obtaining formal
land titles through Brazil’s land regularization program, Terra Legal
(Duchelle et al., 2014). Terra Legal aims to do what CAR does not
– it is program designed to help smallholders acquire land titles.1 Registration in the CAR was technically mandatory in Pará beginning in 2008, but
sanctions for non-compliance were seldom, if ever, applied (Azevedo et al., 2014).
J. L’Roe et al. / Land Use Policy 57 (2016) 193–203 195
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from congress is required for large properties (Pacheco and Benatti,ig. 1. Distribution of land in Pará’s Rural Environmental Registry (CAR). Dark gray s
ut  technically eligible. Registrations overlap designated protected areas, both in pl
ilitary, and indigenous areas).
Why  would registration induce changes in deforestation behav-
or? Landholders may  reduce deforestation on registered properties
ecause of concern about increased visibility to monitoring and
nforcement, or in response to incentives associated with being
isibly compliant. Concerns about enforcement should not apply
o only a speciﬁc property size class, but policy incentives can be
ize speciﬁc. For example, in the revised Forest Code, clearing that
appened prior to July 2008 on small properties is forgiven and
mallholders can use all of their remaining forest area for com-
ensation programs, while any deﬁciencies in the legal reserve
n larger properties must be corrected through reforestation or
ompensation (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). Overlaying the Forest
ode provisions, regularizing claims on government land2 is con-
ingent on environmental compliance only for properties above a
ertain size (Benatti and Fischer, 2011). The suites of regulations
2 Much of the land in Pará is still ofﬁcially held by the state or federal government;
his is the default until landholders make it through the process of regularizing their
and claims and obtaining formal title.areas registered in the CAR as of November 2013. White areas are not yet registered
here this is legal (some sustainable use areas) and where it is not (strict protection,
and incentives applying to different property size classes allow
us to explore whether some sets of incentives are associated with
stronger responses to the environmental registry.
The self-declared boundaries in the environmental registry may
in many instances be the most ofﬁcial record of a property that is
publicly available. As such, we also investigate whether incentives
lead registrants to declare their property boundaries strategically,
in order to fall in a size class with more advantageous policies.
For example, in federal and state land regularization laws, the
process for obtaining title is easier for smallholders3 — on site
inspection may  not be required for small properties while approval2015). Apart from its intended role in facilitating deforestation
reduction by enhancing monitoring and enforcement, the registry
3 For small properties (<∼100 ha), land is donated by the government to the
claimant, medium-sized properties can be purchased directly from the government
at  a discounted rate, and large properties (>∼1500 ha) must be purchased at public
auction (Pacheco and Benatti, 2015).
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selection bias). With the panel data, we  used ﬁxed effects linear
regression to control for the average levels of deforestation on each96 J. L’Roe et al. / Land Us
s also meant to aid policy design by clarifying debates about the
xtent to which smallholders vs. largeholders bear responsibility
or current deforestation (Godar et al., 2012, 2014; Michalski et al.,
010; Richards and Vanwey, 2015). Property boundaries that reveal
he locations of large and small actors over a wide region could also
upport efforts to understand how interactions between smallhold-
rs and largeholders drive deforestation, including displacement
f smallholder settlers by incoming ranchers (Fearnside, 2001;
acheco, 2012) and conﬂict between smallholders and largehold-
rs during struggles to expropriate and redistribute land (Alston
t al., 2000; De Oliveira, 2008; Aldrich et al., 2012). The usefulness
f the registry in this respect is contingent on the assumption that
egistrations reﬂect the actual sizes of landholdings.
.4. Objectives
In the remainder of this paper, we evaluate the initial outcomes
ssociated with Pará’s Rural Environmental Registry. We  focus ﬁrst
n understanding the degree to which land registration has led to
ear-term changes in deforestation behavior. We  test for effects
n property size groups subject to different policy incentives, iso-
ate the effects of registration from background trends within these
roups, and check for perverse increases in deforestation prior
o registration. Next, we assess whether the ease and accessibil-
ty of a self-declared registration system comes with tradeoffs in
nformation quality. We  inspect histograms of registration size
o investigate whether registrations are declared in strategic and
otentially misleading sizes, and we measure the extent of overlap-
ing registrations where claims are not resolved. We  link behavior
o policy and suggest that key aspects of landholder response to the
AR thus far may  be motivated by desire to stake and strengthen
and claims, even though CAR was speciﬁcally designed to be an
nvironmental registry and not a land titling program. We  con-
lude by discussing broader implications of these ﬁndings for land
egistration initiatives.
. Methods
.1. Deﬁning the dataset
Our analysis is based on registrations in the CAR database as
f November 2013 (n = 101,654)4 (SIMLAM-PA, 2013). In its raw
orm, the registry contains many instances of identical and over-
apping properties. We  removed all exact duplicates5 from the
ata set so that properties would not be double-counted. Sum-
ary statistics were calculated over the remaining set of 98,058
roperties. We  used PRODES data for land cover and deforestation
INPE, 2014). For the models assessing impacts of registration on
eforestation behavior, we excluded properties with no remain-
ng primary forest at the beginning of the study period where
ontinued deforestation was no longer possible (n = 20,373). We
lso excluded properties smaller than ﬁve ha to mitigate resolu-
ion issues when assigning deforestation to individual properties
n = 2421). We  excluded properties in locations that were not fully
overed in the preliminary release of the 2014 PRODES forest cover
4 This was  the most recent version available at the time of analysis. Additional
roperties continued to be registered after this date, and in 2014 the new Federal
ystem began to replace the state system.
5 Duplicates were deﬁned as properties whose spatial footprint was  >95% identi-
al.  In cases where multiple registrations were issued to the same landowner for the
ame area, we  kept the observation with the earliest registration date. In cases where
egistrations were issued at multiple dates to multiple entities for the same land
rea, we  assumed these may  have been cases of sales and kept the earliest registra-
ion date. We  removed registrations of outer boundaries of land reform settlement
reas but kept any individual properties registered within settlements.y 57 (2016) 193–203
map, the most recent available at time of analysis (n = 3261). Finally,
to avoid double-counting deforestation and to circumvent model
identiﬁcation problems from assigning multiple registration dates
to one place, we  excluded properties when more than 5% of their
area overlapped with another registered property (n = 34,596).6 In
combination, these restrictions reduced the number in the model
sample to 45,942 properties. We  present model results from this
entire sample as well as from two samples with additional restric-
tions. Additional restrictions hone in on areas with greater potential
for inﬂuence from land titling policies: properties whose majorities
were outside of land reform settlements (INCRA, 2014) and proper-
ties whose spatial footprints were >95% identical to properties that
were also enrolled in the Terra Legal land titling program (Terra
Legal, 2015).
We deﬁned size classes based on a standard deﬁnition in Brazil-
ian land policy (Federal Law 8,629/1993) used in other studies from
this region (Azevedo et al., 2014): properties less than four ﬁs-
cal modules7 are “small,” properties between four and 15 ﬁscal
modules are “medium,” and properties greater than 15 ﬁscal mod-
ules are “large.” Module sizes vary with municipality (between 50
and 75 ha in rural Pará) and we used the appropriate municipal
deﬁnition when classifying registrations. However, as an approxi-
mation for the reader: small properties are less than roughly 300 ha,
medium properties range up to about 1000 ha, and large prop-
erties are generally greater than 1000 ha. There are many more
small properties than medium and large properties, and we  fur-
ther divided this group into “small” properties of less than 100 ha
and “semi-small” properties between 100 ha and 4 modules. One
hundred hectares is often the maximum parcel size allocated in
land reform settlement projects, and four modules is the legal
cut-off when deﬁning a small family farm for economic purposes
(Federal Law 11,326/2006). Thus our small category captures most
land reform settlers and what would traditionally be thought of as
“smallholders,” and our semi-small category could be settlers who
have acquired additional land, wealthier “smallholder” colonists,
or partially declared properties of larger landholders.
2.2. Modeling the impact of registration on deforestation behavior
To assess deforestation outcomes related to property mapping,
we modeled the effects of registration timing on the amount of
deforestation occurring on a property in a given year.8 Essen-
tially, we  assess how registration changes the behavior of those
who enroll in the program by comparing the rates of deforestation
on registered properties to the rates of deforestation on proper-
ties that were not yet registered but that eventually registered by
November 2013. This approach ensures that we  measure effects
associated with the act of registration and not effects associated
with differences in the kinds of landholders that choose to par-
ticipate in the system or the kind of land that gets enrolled (i.e.property due to time constant factors like distance to market or
6 Because this group was so large, we  performed robustness checks without this
restriction and with higher overlap thresholds. The model results were not sensitive
to variations in this restriction.
7 Land and property laws in Brazil often refer to the concept of a ‘ﬁscal module’.
This is a size unit that is deﬁned for each municipality according to the amount
of  land required for the primary economic activities of that region (Federal Decree
84,685/1980).
8 We used the listed date of registration in the system — provisional CAR licenses
were granted almost instantaneously in Pará. Registration dates were aggregated
into years beginning in August and running through July in order to synch more
closely with the time window considered in the maps of annual deforestation
released by the PRODES satellite monitoring program (e.g. 2010 = August 2009–July
2010).
e Policy 57 (2016) 193–203 197
g
ﬁ
a
p
e
i
f
f
D
u
o
o

e
a
i
g
p
2
(
w
t
r
W
w
(
t
b
a
a
m
2
p
c
p
m
s
t
t
t
e
m
t
u
o
l
1
y
i
y
a
p
Fig. 2. Falling background trends for deforestation by size class. Averages are shownJ. L’Roe et al. / Land Us
eographic characteristics, and we included additional year level
xed effects to control for background temporal trends occurring
cross the sample due to factors like ﬂuctuations in commodity
rices. The combination of property level information with ﬁxed
ffects regression helps to isolate changes in deforestation behav-
or due to registration from the suite of other dynamics affecting
orest clearing. Models followed the two structures shown below,
or property i in time t.
eforit =  i +  t +  ˇ × (ifregisteredbeforeorduringyeart)it + εit (1)
Deforit =  i +  t + ˇ1 × (ifregisteredinyeart + 1)it + ˇ2
× (ifregisteredinyeart)it + ˇ3
× (ifalreadyregisteredbeforeyeart)it + εit (2)
We  examined annual deforestation on a property (Deforit)
sing both a binary indicator of whether or not any deforestation
ccurred in a given year and a continuous indicator for the amount
f deforestation occurring in a given year.9 The variables i and
t are the property and year ﬁxed effects, respectively. Standard
rrors are clustered at the municipality level to account for spatial
utocorrelation of properties. For Eq. (1), the ‘treatment’ variable
s a binary indicator for whether a property was registered in a
iven year, including properties that were already registered in
rior years. We  ran this model over the time period from August
009 to July 2013, when the bulk of registrations occurred.For Eq.
2), the ‘treatment’ variable is broken into three categories, where
e separated the effects of the year immediately prior to regis-
ration, the year of registration, and the years after registration,
elative to the reference level of over a year prior to registration.
e ran the Eq. (2) model for August 2008 to July 2012, the years
ith sufﬁcient properties in each category of registration timing
Table 1). This model allowed us to check for increases in deforesta-
ion immediately prior to registering that could potentially have
een induced by knowledge that properties would be monitored
fter registration. To allow for heterogeneous registration effects
nd background trends according to property size, we ran separate
odels for our four size-classes of properties.
.3. The search for evidence of strategic registration
We  examined the distribution of registrations using a histogram
lotting the frequency of properties of different sizes. Peaks indi-
ate relatively common sizes. We  would expect a high frequency of
roperties allocated at standard sizes in colonization and resettle-
ent programs (e.g. 100 ha), with clustering around these standard
izes due to imprecise surveying and other technical factors. In con-
rast, much denser distributions on only one side of a peak suggest
hat land is acquired, or is simply being registered, with an eye
oward property size thresholds related to policy incentives. For
xample, if up to 100 ha of land can be claimed for no cost, one
ight expect more 98 ha parcels than 102 ha parcels to be regis-
ered. Landholders might declare only 99 ha of a larger piece they
se, or might register a 190 ha parcel as two 95 ha units. We  test
9 We used the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for our continuous measure
f  the amount of deforestation. This behaves almost identically to the more common
og transformation, except that it is also deﬁned for values of zero (Burbidge et al.,
988). This allows for handling the frequent cases of no deforestation in a given
ear similar to a binary measure, but also varies with extent of deforestation when
t  occurs. We also modeled the proportion of remaining forest cleared in a given
ear; patterns were basically the same as the binary and continuous measures. For
ll  deforestation measures, we used linear models for ease of interpretation with
anel data.for  the 45,942 properties in the deforestation models, which exclude properties with
no  forest remaining in 2007.
for strategic registration by investigating instances where prop-
erties were registered disproportionately frequently at sizes just
below policy thresholds. We  calculated the ratio between prop-
erties that registered just below and those just above threshold
values along a scale based on increments of one hundred hectares,
and along a scale based on increments of ﬁscal modules.10 Based on
our review of pertinent land and forest laws, Table 2 summarizes
which of these incremental thresholds corresponds with actual
policy thresholds and incentives. If people register to strategically
qualify for the beneﬁts of one of these policies, we would expect
disproportionate registration below the corresponding size thresh-
olds. Though the environmental registry is not directly connected
to several of the policies in Table 2, we  include them because land-
holders may  think of the registry as an opportunity to ofﬁcially
delineate boundaries in a way  that may  help them in other arenas
(e.g., future land regularization efforts).
3. Results
3.1. Summary statistics for deforestation trends and landholdings
As of late 2013, roughly half of the eligible land in Pará was
registered in the CAR system. Small properties accounted for the
majority of registrations, yet most of the registered land area and
even more of the registered forest area was held in larger proper-
ties (Table 3). Across all size classes, the amount of deforestation
declined from 2007 to 2011 and then stabilized (Fig. 2). Properties
in the largest size class still clear more on average than proper-
ties in the smallest class, but absolute deforestation rates declined
most steeply on large properties−thus, the mean annual amount
of deforestation on small and large properties has become more
comparable over the past decade. In fact, while deforestation at the
beginning of the study period in 2007 was  much more likely to
occur on larger properties, by 2014, deforestation was just as likely
to be found on small properties (Table 3). These general trends are
related to processes other than CAR registration. The panel models
seek to identify additional reductions in deforestation associated
with enrolling in the environmental registry, beyond these signiﬁ-
cant background trends.
10 We tested within a range of ±5 ha. In the absence of threshold effects, the ratio
of  properties just under vs. just over a certain size should be close to 1:1 within a
narrow window of 10 ha.
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Table 1
Timing of registration for each size class in the model sample of properties.
Yeara Small Semi-small Medium Large Total
2008 31 14 10 16 71
2009  95 40 67 82 284
2010  1716 1275 1334 834 5159
2011  3684 1975 1018 595 7272
2012  5895 2646 1293 666 10,500
2013  8420 2988 1393 726 13,527
2014  6638 1519 650 322 9129
Total  26,479 10,457 5765 3241 45,942
a Year follows the PRODES calendar and includes the previous August through July of the indicated year (e.g. August 2007-July 2008 = “2008”). Italicized years (2008 and
2009)  were excluded from impact models because there were very few registrations. Our dataset only contains registrations from the ﬁrst 4 months of 2014 (August–November
2013).
Table 2
Summary of legal thresholds.
Threshold Summary of policies relevant
to property size thresholds
Relevant law
1 ﬁscal module (50–75 ha) Below this amount, federal lands are donated to claimants. Federal Land Regularization Law (11,952/2009)
100 ha Below this amount, state lands are donated to claimants. Pará Land Regularization Law (7,289/2009)
4 ﬁscal modules (200–300 ha) Below this amount, forest cleared prior to 2008 is forgiven
and claims for federal lands are not subject to onsite
inspection if the property remains free of additional
violations.
Federal Forest Code (12,651/2012); Federal Decree on Land
Regularization (6,992/2009)
300 ha In 2010 the state made it easier for properties below this
size to obtain a CAR license by lowering the amount of
required data and increasing the number of institutions
authorized to register boundaries.
Normative Instruction Amending Pará CAR Law (37/2010)
500 ha Above this amount, property claims require an economic
use plan and are subject to veriﬁcation by an outside
agency.
Pará Decree on Land Regularization (2,135/2010)
15 ﬁscal modules(750–1125 ha) Below this amount, land claims can be regularized through
the  Terra Legal program and purchased at discounted
rates; above this amount federal land must be purchased
at  public auction.
Federal Land Regularization Law (11,952/2009)
1500 ha Above this amount, approval from the state assembly is
required for purchase of state lands.
Pará Decree on Land Regularization (2,135/2010)
2500 ha Above this amount, congressional approval is required for
purchase of both federal and state lands.
Federal Land Regularization Law (11,952/2009); Pará
Decree on Land Regularization (2,135/2010)
Table 3
Relative importancea of different size classes in the environmental registry.
Portion of
registrations (%)
Portion of
registered land
(%)
Portion of
registered
primary forest
(%)
Portion of
registered
deforestation in
2007b (%)
Portion of registered deforestation in 2014b (%)
Small 63.5 10.6 6.1 13.2 29.1
Semi-sm 21.1 11.0 7.5 15.4 25.1
Medium 10.2 20.0 18.2 24.9 20.6
Large  5.2 58.4 68.1 46.4 25.2
a Percentages are based on the larger set of 98,058 properties, after duplicates were removed but before restricting sample to properties that still contain forest. However,
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semi-smallholders was greater among the subset of registrants
known to be seeking land titles. We found that the deforestation-
reducing effect was  about three times larger on CAR properties that
11 We also tested for the effect in properties at the small end of the medium size
range (those between four and seven modules) as a robustness check that the differ-rends  are similar when calculated for the restricted model sample and all values d
b The portion of deforestation that falls within each size category, out of the tot
013  (INPE, 2014).
.2. Effects of registration on deforestation among different
roperty size classes
Registration had little effect on deforestation behavior over-
ll. This result is sensitive to the time window used in the model.
ncluding deforestation from years prior to 2010 leads to a larger
verall effect. Our focus on the years in which the bulk of proper-
ies registered is conservative. However, responses to registration
aried by property size-class. Among semi-small properties, reduc-
ions were modest but statistically signiﬁcant. On these properties,
egistration reduced the probability of any deforestation by nine
ercent and reduced the extent of deforestation by 5.3%, relative to
nregistered properties (Table 4). This pattern persisted when wey less than ﬁve percentage points.
cted by PRODES for that year within the area registered in the CAR by November
excluded properties that overlapped land reform settlements. No
signiﬁcant effects were evident for any other size classes.11
The modest but statistically signiﬁcant effect of registration forence in registration effects represents a discontinuity at the legal threshold deﬁning
smallholders and not a gradual difference corresponding to property size. Even
among the smaller properties in the medium category, registration did not cause
a  decrease in deforestation behavior in the way  that it did for the properties under
the legal smallholder cut-off.
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Table  4
Effecta of registration in CAR system on annual deforestation by size class.
Overall Small Semi-small Medium Large
Full Sample of CAR
registrations
Effect on probability of defor(% change) −2.6 −2.3 −9.2* 4.3 3.2
Effect on extent of clearing (% change) −1.9 −1.4 −5.3*** 1.2 −1.3
n  45,942 26,479 10,457 5765 3241
Set  of CAR registrations
excluding land reform
settlement areasb
Effect on probability of defor(% change) −4.4 −7.4 −8.7† 2.8 3.2
Effect on extent of clearing (% change) −1.9†  −2.1 −5.2** 0.6 −1.3
n  29,571 13,680 7745 4905 3241
Set  of CAR registrations
in Terra Legal titling
processc
Effect on probability of defor(% change) −9.4 4.4 −28.6* 3.2 N/A
Effect on extent of clearing (% change) −4.7 2 −13.8* −2.3 N/A
n  2328 1156 822 330 N/A
a Signiﬁcance levels indicated by †:  p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001. Results are from models using a binary outcome for deforestation (probability) and a
continuous transformed measure of deforestation (extent). Percent change was  calculated relative to the modeled deforestation outcome for unregistered properties. Results
are  based on analysis time window from August 2009 - July 2013.
b This is the subset of properties that fall outside areas identiﬁed as INCRA land reform settlements. Land reform settlements are subject to different and additional land
governance policies and procedures.
c This is the subset of the properties registered in the CAR whose spatial locations align
title.  Large properties are not eligible for titling through this program.
Table 5
Effecta of registration timing on deforestation.b
Overall Small Semi-Small Medium Large
Year before registration 0% 1% 0% −4% 0%
Year of registration −3% −1% −7%* −1% −5%
After registration year −2% 3% −11%* −2% 1%
a *: p < 0.05.
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on deforestation overall.16 We  can speak to the impact of registra-
tion on enrolled properties, but we  cannot speak to deforestation
and land claiming dynamics on land that was  not enrolled. For
Pará where a ﬁscal module is equal to 100 ha, so, for example, 1500 ha and 15 ﬁscal
modules are never equivalent.
13 The only instance where signiﬁcantly more properties register just over a thresh-
old  occurs in the small group around 900 ha. This is likely due to reasons apart from
regularization and forest policies; we found no references to this size cut-off in our
research.
14 There are no corresponding legal thresholds that we are aware of to explain
the moderately higher proportions registering areas just under 2 ﬁscal modules andb Results from the model using the continuous (transformed) measure of defor-
station. Results are expressed as the percent change from the reference level of
eforestation over a year prior to registration.
ere also part of the Terra Legal land titling program, but again, only
n the semi-smallholder class. In this program, during the mort-
age period when landholders are purchasing the property from
he state, environmental infractions can trigger cancellation of the
rocess. For the subset of semi-small smallholders seeking land
itles in Terra Legal, the chance of deforestation drops by almost
0% after property registration.
.3. Strategic registration and ambiguous ownership
To test for strategic clearing before entering the system, we
xplored how deforestation changed for properties about to regis-
er, those in the midst of registering, and those already registered in
 previous year, rather than making a simple before-and-after com-
arison (Eq. (2)). We  ﬁnd no signiﬁcant increase in deforestation in
he year immediately preceding registration for properties of any
ize class (Table 5). In concordance with earlier results, only semi-
mall properties show a signiﬁcant decrease in clearing behavior
uring the year of registration and in subsequent years.
Though we do not ﬁnd evidence for strategic clearing behav-
or, we do ﬁnd evidence for strategic registration. As expected, we
ee high frequencies of properties allocated at standard sizes in
olonization and resettlement programs (e.g. 100 ha), with cluster-
ng around these standard sizes due to imprecise surveying and
ther technical factors. We  also see places where there are denser
istributions on only one side of a peak, suggesting that land is
egistered with an eye toward property size thresholds related to
olicy incentives. A histogram of registered property sizes (Fig. 3)
eveals several locations where property size frequency stacks dis-
roportionately below particular peaks. Thresholds are evident at
00 ha, 1125 ha,12 1500 ha, and 2500 ha. Visually, it is difﬁcult to
ell whether other peaks in the histogram exhibit disproportion-
12 75 ha is one of the most common ﬁscal module sizes, which means that for
5% of the properties in our sample, 1125 ha and 15 ﬁscal modules represent the
ame threshold, as do 300 ha and 4 ﬁscal modules. There are no municipalities in with properties in the Terra Legal database; i.e. those known to be actively seeking
ate stacking, but ratio tests revealed additional threshold effects
(Table 6). Signiﬁcantly more properties register just under13 1, 2, 4,
and 15 ﬁscal modules, as well as 100, 200, 300, 500, and 1500 ha.
Almost all of these sizes correspond to speciﬁc legal thresholds,14
which are largely about tenure regularization and not directly con-
nected to the environmental registry (see Table 2).
Finally, we  found a substantial amount of overlap among land
registrations in the declaratory system. When intersecting the spa-
tial dataset of registered property boundaries with itself, 27,991
(27.5%) of property registrations overlapped by more than 5% and
less than 95% with another registration.15 These overlapping reg-
istrations may  signal inaccurately drawn boundaries, contentious
land claims, or accumulated versions of properties that were re-
registered with different shapes for a variety of potential reasons.
4. Discussion
4.1. Has the environmental registry caused landholders to reduce
deforestation?
Though deforestation fell in the region during our study period,
most of this decline was not a direct result of the environmen-
tal registry. The majority of registrants did not substantially alter
their clearing behavior immediately following (or preceding) reg-
istration, in our time window of analysis. Note that our study was
designed to measure how registration affected individual land-
holder behavior, which is different than the effect of the program200 ha unless there is intent to later split the properties.
15 Overlapping areas greater than 5% are not easily explainable by small mapping
errors, and overlap less than 95% excludes cases of multiple registrations of the same
property due to system errors and sales, or small individual properties registered
within larger settlement boundaries.
16 Because registrations are the unit of analysis, changes in deforestation on small
properties count as much as changes on large properties. This tells more about how
the  CAR is working as a suite of incentives (i.e. how many people have changed
their behavior) and less about how much reduced deforestation the program has
stimulated.
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Fig. 3. Histogram of registered property sizes. The distribution evinces distinct modes and propensity to stack below certain size thresholds.
Table 6
Proportion of properties just undera vs. just overa a range of size thresholds.c
threshold (modules) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Ratioa 1.2 1.4 1.1 2.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.9 2.8 1.1
Countb 4,818 1,063 587 834 205 167 226 118 110 89 70 64 89 120 252 56
P-valc 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.49 0.16 0.57 0.07 0.28 0.88 0.74 0.16 0.65 0.44 0.00 0.70
threshold (hectares) 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600
Ratioa 1.2 0.9 1.9 1 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.3
Countb 9,919 1,044 697 215 330 101 78 69 67 161 89 49 24 30 83 23
P-valc 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.67 0.34 0.23 0.01 0.44 0.18 0.07 1.00 0.61 0.00 0.38
a The ratio of the properties in the ﬁve hectares just below a threshold compared to the ﬁve hectares just above a threshold.
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itate land regularization. This is supported by the fact that the
deforestation reduction effect is three times larger for the semi-b The number of registrations within ±ﬁve hectares of a threshold.
c The probability that the proportion just under is equal to the proportion just ove
re  highlighted in boldface.
nrolled properties, a weak or neutral initial effect on deforesta-
ion is not surprising since the primary aim of the CAR program
n Pará thus far has been to gather boundary information to facili-
ate future monitoring and enforcement. Though in theory it made
roperties publicly visible, few organizations had full access to
he CAR database, and it was rarely used for enforcement against
llegal deforestation (possibly to avoid discouraging future regis-
rations). If property holders did not feel that registration increased
he likelihood of enforcement, they would have had little reason to
hange deforestation behavior. This may  especially be the case for
arger properties whose boundaries were more likely to be pub-
icly documented by other means outside of the CAR (Rajão and
urdubakis, 2013; Reydon et al., 2015) and thus were already vul-
erable to enforcement associated with monitoring programs that
receded the CAR, such as the DETER satellite monitoring program
Assunc¸ ão et al., 2014; Arima et al., 2014). A report from the Ama-
on Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) found a similar result
f little overall impact from Pará’s CAR, though they report larger
eductions on small and medium properties and an increase in
eforestation on large properties (Azevedo et al., 2014). This may
e due in part to different time windows of analysis and in part to
he use of year-by-year comparisons among registered and unreg-n the number of properties within ﬁve ha of the threshold. Known legal thresholds
istered properties rather than ﬁxed effects models. Evaluations of
the antecedent environmental licensing program (SLAPR) in the
neighboring state of Mato Grosso also indicated that registration
did not decrease deforstation and in some instances increased it
(Rajão et al., 2012; Azevedo and Saito, 2013). We found no evi-
dence for signiﬁcant effects of increased deforestation before or
after registration in Pará.
Despite the lack of a strong overall effect on clearing behav-
ior thus far, our results demonstrate that registration did lead
to a decrease in deforestation for one particular size class: the
semi-small properties (100 to ∼300 ha). The discontinuity between
behavior on semi-small properties and those in neighboring size
classes suggests that the explanation is related to policies that
treat these groups differently rather than inherent differences
among large and small actors. The deforestation responses of dif-
ferent property size classes could be explained if some landholders
enrolled in the environmental registry in hopes that it would facil-small properties known to be already involved in the Terra Legal
e Polic
t
t
“
f
i
r
l
p
o
s
p
S
t
i
c
F
c
d
r
t
s
u
c
p
g
w
N
t
t
t
t
P
t
e
t
t
m
o
c
p
d
t
p
t
o
L
m
w
t
m
t
a
n
p
b
a
l
s
m
l
(J. L’Roe et al. / Land Us
itling program.17 These properties may  have reduced deforesta-
ion after registering because they fell in an unintended policy
sweet-spot” created by an interaction of land regularization and
orest protection policies.
Semi-small properties are at the larger end of Brazil’s legal def-
nition for “small family farms.T¨hey are larger than typical land
eform settlement allocations, but could be owned by wealthier
and reform settlers who have acquired additional land. Semi-small
roperties could also be owned by settlers with historic claims
n land that still ofﬁcially belongs to the government, or semi-
mall properties could belong to landholders with more extensive
roperties registered in smaller pieces for strategic reasons.18
emi-small properties are large enough that landholders must pay
o purchase the land from the government if they want to regular-
ze their claims,19 though they pay a rate below market value and
an pay it off over a 10-year period (Pará State Decree 2,135/2010,
ederal Decree 6,992/2009). The right to gain title might be can-
elled if environmental infractions are detected on the property
uring this pay-down period (Pará State Decree 2,135/2010). Envi-
onmental infractions can also trigger an external inspection of
he property claim that is otherwise waived for properties in this
ize class (Federal Decree 6,992/2009). This means that, at least
ntil a property is paid down, obtaining a title is facilitated by
ompliance with environmental policies. This does not apply to
roperties less than 100 ha; these are donated to claimants by the
overnment and thus do not have a sensitive mortgage period,
hich may  explain the lack of response in the smallest size class.
or does it apply for large properties over ∼1500 ha that must go
hrough other legal channels outside of the Terra Legal program
o receive title. Medium-sized properties should still be subject
o the government mortgage period, but we do not see evidence
hat registration affects deforestation behavior in that size class.
erhaps property owners in this class are wealthy enough to buy
heir land without a government mortgage, but we  would not
xpect wealth to be discontinuous between semi-small proper-
ies and medium properties. An alternative explanation is that, for
he medium-sized properties, the cost of coming into compliance
ay  overwhelm any beneﬁts that such compliance might confer
n easing the titling process (Stickler et al., 2013). There is a dis-
ontinuous cost of compliance between semi-small and medium
roperties: in the 2012 Forest Code, areas cleared prior to mid-2008
o not need to be replanted or compensated on properties smaller
han four ﬁscal modules (Law 12,651/2012). Environmental com-
liance is disproportionately more difﬁcult for properties just over
he size threshold for forgiveness. Medium properties must replant
r pay to compensate any areas cleared beyond their designated
egal Reserve, which can be as much as 80% of the property. This
eans that the semi-small properties are in the unique position
here environmental compliance both facilitates receiving a land
itle and does not incur heavy costs.
17 Far more properties are registered in the CAR than there are to date in the slower
oving Terra Legal land titling program. However, the presence of the Terra Legal in
he  region may have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced landholder behavior, especially since
 CAR was  required to be eligible for regularization through Terra Legal. Properties
ot yet involved in the titling process might still have seen a CAR registration as a
otential step toward strengthening property claims.
18 Although technically these properties would be ineligible for most smallholder
eneﬁts, which apply only to producers with small total landholdings, we are not
ware of any measures that prevent families from registering areas up to particular
imits in the names of various relatives and pooling their use.
19 In the absence of an ofﬁcial title, land in the Amazon falls in the category of “unas-
igned public land” held by the government. Though it is technically unassigned,
uch has long been used and occupied. The 2009 Land Regularization Law estab-
ishes a procedure for occupants to purchase their land claims from the government
Oliveira 2013).y 57 (2016) 193–203 201
A reduction in deforestation on semi-small properties is encour-
aging, especially because smallholders can be hard to reach with
market-based and command-and-control policies (Coudel et al.,
2012), and smaller properties are becoming responsible for an
increasing component of the deforestation in Pará as deforestation
rates decline more steeply on larger properties. However, while the
semi-small properties represent 21% of registrations in Pará, they
contain only 7.5% of registered forested land. Many small proper-
ties contain no forest at all. At the end of 2013, half of the eligible
land in the state was  not yet registered to any size class. Thus, a sub-
stantial amount of unprotected primary forest is not yet captured
within the registration system, and the vast majority of forest on
registered properties does not fall in the size class that is currently
incentivized to reduce deforestation following registration. Field-
based studies in Pará indicate that many landholders in Para are
aware of legal thresholds, especially those related to titling and
land regularization (Campbell, 2015).
4.2. Information quality under declaratory registration
Denser stacking of property sizes just below legal thresholds
indicates that landholders may  not be registering their entire or
exact holdings. This could mean registering parts of their prop-
erty and leaving the rest unregistered, or registering land in
strategically-sized segments under different names, or claiming
conveniently-sized pieces that may  be unrelated to what they are
actually using. Strategic registration could hamper the effective-
ness of environmental monitoring. If people do not register their
entire landholdings, then it is possible that future deforestation
may  be concentrated in unregistered places that avoid enforce-
ment, resulting in spatial leakage of deforestation. If people split
land into strategically-sized pieces under different names, this
could either allow people who are not truly eligible to fall into
the category where deforestation prior to 2008 does not need to
be compensated, or allow people to keep a ‘clean’ property as
a basis for sales while committing environmental infractions on
other properties they are using (Gibbs et al., 2015). One  of the objec-
tives of the environmental cadastres in the Amazon is to reduce
enforcement expenses by decreasing the need for costly site visits
to remote areas (Rajão et al., 2012). However, if there are questions
about the extent to which registered boundaries represent actual
holdings, or if holdings are overlapping, site visits remain just as
necessary as before. Evidence for strategic claim-sizes also raises a
red ﬂag concerning the use of CAR to understand the deforestation
impacts of smallholders versus largeholders; it is not necessarily
safe to assume that formally declared small properties actually
belong to smallholders.
The ease of registering claims in the Pará CAR has paid off in
coverage; over 30,000,000 ha of land are now registered, at least
provisionally. The CAR as it stands represents a dramatic increase
in information and its creation has not led to perverse deforestation
outcomes. Yet, jumping ahead to map  claims without ﬁrst resolving
or legitimizing claims has risks. Use of the database for enforce-
ment will be hampered by lack of certainty about the accuracy of
the information it contains, and it is unlikely that the registry can
have a large or continuing effect on deforestation without stronger
connection to enforcement. It remains to be seen whether Pará’s
initiative will prove a worthwhile investment for reducing defor-
estation. As the new federal CAR system (SICAR) comes on line,
state and federal environmental agencies are beginning to move
the 98% of registrations that made it only to the “provisional” phase
in Pará through the more stringent veriﬁcation and environmen-
tal recovery planning (PRA) phases of the registration process. This
will require all boundary overlaps to be resolved and calls for heavy
investment in inspection procedures. In the meantime, care must
be taken when using and interpreting data from what was meant
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o be an initial phase.20 Field validations of the registry data should
e undertaken to inform efforts to expand or replicate the program
lsewhere.
.3. Mapping for environmental monitoring or staking land
laims
Strategic positioning with regard to land claims is predictable
n a system where boundaries are essentially self-declared. Indeed,
and holdings and land claims are notoriously chaotic in Brazil,
nd especially in the Amazon, where there have been compet-
ng and fraudulent claims for centuries (Brannstrom, 2001; Jepson,
006; Bourguignon, 2013). However, it is somewhat surprising to
ee strategic positioning that is more about land claims than envi-
onmental policy in an environmental registry that was  meant to
e separate from questions of tenure security. Stacking beneath
our ﬁscal modules could signal that owners were responding to
he clause in the Forest Code that forgives historic clearing under
hat threshold. However, none of the other sizes where stacking
ccurred are mentioned in the Forest Code, while all the thresholds
including four ﬁscal modules) are meaningful in land regulariza-
ion laws, speciﬁcally various criteria that grant an easier titling
rocess. The decline in deforestation for semi-small properties was
ikely due to its perceived connection with titling. This bolsters the
rgument that landholders may  have come to view the environ-
ental registry as a hopeful step on a path toward a future land
itle, rather than as a tool that facilitates monitoring of their land
se. The process of issuing land titles through Terra Legal and other
hannels has been criticized as being unacceptably slow and hav-
ng negligible impact (Oliveira, 2013), but our ﬁndings suggest that
andholders are paying attention to their government’s efforts to
esolve tenure issues in the Amazon and that the impacts of such
rograms may  be magniﬁed by other policies.
The link between the environmental registry and land regular-
zation means that from the perspective of relevant landholders, the
AR might be perceived as part of a land regularization initiative
ith tenure incentives contingent on environmental performance.
his is despite the fact that during the period under study, there
as not yet a legal basis for CAR boundaries to be translated into
egal land claims, and both the Pará CAR program and the newer
ederal SICAR program explicitly stated that environmental regis-
ration was not intended to support land claims (Pará State Decree
◦ 1,148/2008, Portal Brasil, 2015). Nevertheless, local perceptions
nd expectations may  not be unfounded; in 2013, modiﬁcations
o the state’s Green Municipalities program opened the path to
itle for some properties registered with CAR in municipalities
hat had achieved certain environmental goals (Pará State Decree
39/2013). Furthermore, there are currently discussions in Pará
bout the potential to use the CAR database in future ofﬁcial land
itling efforts (Monteiro, 2015). This turn of events would certainly
egitimize registrants’ hopes that the CAR would eventually become
 step toward land titles. If this happens, our ﬁndings about strategic
laiming around size thresholds and interactions between envi-
onmental and tenure policy incentives should become even more
elevant.
. ConclusionPara’s experience with its Rural Environmental Registry pro-
ram offers several lessons for other environmental registration
20 For example, there are reports that some banks and vendors accept a
¨ rovisionalC¨AR license as proof of environmental compliance in order to meet indus-
ry  policies to restrict loans to or sales from people who practice illegal deforestation
Azevedo et al., 2014).y 57 (2016) 193–203
initiatives. It is possible to map  claims prior to resolving them, and
the combination of few veriﬁcation requirements, positive incen-
tives to register, and an easy declaratory process facilitated a high
volume of registrations, including among smallholders who can
be under-represented in property mapping efforts. We show that
some motivations for enrolling in the registry and reducing defor-
estation are tied to incentives from a parallel land policy as opposed
to the incentives offered directly by the CAR. In particular, some
are hoping that boundary maps from the CAR will facilitate the
land titling processes. This may  also explain registration’s impact
on deforestation for certain size classes, because the land titling
process is also facilitated by avoiding environmental infractions.
Our ﬁndings highlight the need to pay attention to the interaction
of policies and incentives that can produce “sweet-spots,s¨trategic
leveraging, and other combinatory effects. Our results suggest that
under strong incentives, environmental registries have the poten-
tial to reduce deforestation, but without such incentives, their effect
on deforestation behavior is neutral. The registry’s value for forest
conservation depends primarily on the usefulness of the data for
future enforcement of environmental regulations, not as a ‘ﬁx’ in
and of itself. This means the trade-off between volume of registra-
tions and legitimacy of registrations must be taken seriously, along
with the ways that parallel programs can affect registration incen-
tives. Though self-declared registrations facilitate wider coverage,
self-declaration of boundaries under differentiated policy incen-
tives may  encourage users to make claims that misrepresent their
actual land use or landholdings. This may  limit the degree to which
the registry can facilitate environmental enforcement. In places
where land tenure concerns rival environmental pressures, gov-
ernment and conservation sponsors will need to continue to invest
in resolving uncertainty related to land ownership.
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